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has never been made.
It follows that the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed.

Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 25,
1954. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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18640.
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'l'HOMAS W. GOWANIJOCK et al., Respondents, v. JAMES
TURNER, as Manager of Utilities, etc., et al., Appellants; JOSEPH ROBINSON, Intervener and Appellant.
[1] Statutes-Mandatory and Directory Acts.--Requirements of a
statute are directory, not mandatory, unless means be provided for its enforcement.

[2] Municipal Corporations-Employees- Compensation- Hours
of Service and Overtime.-San Francisco Charter, § 12.5, defining basie work day for platform men or bus operators in
municipal railway system as eight hours, to be completed within ten consecutive hours, and providing overtime pay for all
labor
in excess of eight hours in any one day,
does not require city to pay for eight hours of work on a
given day or 48 hours per week regardless of duties performed,
but merely specifies basis of compensation for employees.

[3] !d.-Employees-Compensation--Hours of Service and Overtime.-Failme of former San l~rancisco Charter, § 33 (carried
into § 150 of new charter in 1932) to change basic provision
that "No . . . employee of the City and County shall be paid
for a greater time than that covered by his actual service," at
time § 125 of chnrter, relating to bnsic work da.Y for platform
men or bus operators in municipal rail w:c1y system, was
See Cal.Jur.,
§ 247 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Municipal Corporations,
McK. Dig. References: [1] Statutes, § 11; [2-C'>] Municipal Corporntions, § 301; [G-11] Municipal Corporations, § 302.

Feb.1954]

[ 4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

GowANLOOK v.

TuRNER

297

[42 C.2d 296; 267 P.2d 310]

amended in 1924 and 1925, shows a legislative intent to specify
a basis of compensation for railroad workers not in conflict
with existing mandate of charter prohibiting payment for
service not performed.
!d.-Employees-Compensation-Hours of Service and Overtime.-In view of provision of former charter of San Francisco specifying a minimum wage and maximum hours of work
for employees on railways privately owned, with overtime employment allowed if paid for at time and one-half, omission,
from 1925 amendment of § 125 of charter, of similar provisions
in regard to municipal railway may be taken as evidence that
new proposal was not intended to guarantee either a particular amount of wages or a work day of a given number
of hours.
!d.-Employees-Compensation-Hours of Service and Overtime.-Mere established practice of municipal railway management in San Francisco prior to 1946 of paying a full eight
hours' pay for a regular run of seven hours and 45 minutes
does not show an administrative interpretation in favor of an
eight-hour guaranteed workday.
!d.-Employees- Compensation- Fixing of Compensation.Wages of employees of municipal railway cannot be fixed by
formula provided in San Francisco Charter, § 151.3, that where
there is established "a rate of pay for . . . groups or crafts
through collective bargaining agreements with employers employing such groups or crafts, and such rate is recognized
and paid throughout the industry and the establishments employing such groups or crafts in San Francisco," the civil service commission must certify to board of supervisors the prevailing rates, since nearly all public transportation service
in San Francisco is performed by municipal railway and, accordingly, there is no "prevailing rate of pay" established for
street railway employees within city and county.
!d.-Employees- Compensation- Fixing of Compensation.N o distinction between use of term "rate of pay" in earlier
part of San Francisco Charter, § 151.3, and use of "wages"
and "wage schedules" in portion relating specifically to municipal railway employees was intended, where provisions relating
to municipal railway employees use both "rate of pay" and
"wages" interchangeably, and where both parts are aimed at
providing standards of compensation for particular groups of
city and county employees and vary only as to methods used
in determining them.
!d.-Employees-Compensation-Rate of Pay.-A guarantee
as to minimum hours of work does not affect rate of an employee's pay, that is, amount of compensation per unit of
wo,.k, but deals only with number of hours of work to which
m.. employee may claim to be entitled; such a provision is
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without scope of municipal charter section establishing method
of computing basic "rate of pay" for employees.
[9] !d.-Employees- Compensation- Fixing of Compensation.San Francisco Charter, § 151.3, requiring wages of municipal
railway employees to be computed annually on basis of two
highest wag·e schedules of other street railways in state, does
not require consideration of minimum hours of work guarantees in such schedules, since to pay each employee a minimum of eight hours per day it would be necessary to revise
entire operating schedule to provide work for such hours and
to revise it continually with every change in guaranteed hours
of those wage schedules to which reference would be made.
[10] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Fixing of Compensation.In fixing wages of municipal railway employees according to
San Francisco Charter, § 151.3, requiring an annual computation by averaging two highest wage schedules of other street
railways in state established as of July 1st of each year, board
of supervisors may not assign a monetary value to a specific
guarantee of hours and average it with wages stated in
schedules consulted, since if such method were adopted the
board of supervisors would have to place a money value on all
benefits received by employees under such schedules, and also
on similar benefits guaranteed under charter, and fix wage
schedule for municipal railway accordingly, thereby imposing
on board the burden of evaluating an endless variety of
benefits.
[11] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Fixing of Compensation.It is not unreasonable to construe San Francisco Charter,
§ 151.3, requiring wages of municipal railway employees to be
fixed by averaging two highest wage schedules of other street
railways in state, as placing on board of supervisors a simple
averaging process; such board has sole authority to fix wages
and salaries and, although it generally is vested with wide discretion in computing them, the charter section is a direct
limitation on that power.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. I. L. Harris, Judge.
Reversed.
Action for declaratory relief, and proceeding in mandamus
to compel manager of utilities of public utilities commission
to approve and transmit to civil service commission payrolls
crediting each employee with minimum of eight hours of
work for each working day, and to compel civil service commission to certify to board of supervisors a wage schedule
guaranteeing minimum wages and hours of employment for
the operating personnel. Judgment for petitioners reversed.
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Dion R. Holm, City Attorney (San Francisco), and A. Dal
Thomson, Public Utilities Counsel, for Appellants.
Lamson, Jordan & Walsh for Intervener and Appellant.
Tobriner & Lazarus, Mathew 0. Tobriner and Stanley H.
Neyhart for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-Several employees of the municipal railway of the city and county of San Francisco, on behalf of
themselves and all other employees similarly situated, sued
for writs of mandate and for declaratory relief. Named as
defendants are the manager of utilities of the public utilities
commission, the members of the civil service commission and
its secretary, and the controller. Joseph Robinson, on behalf
of the taxpayers of the city and county, has filed a complaint
in intervention in opposition to the employees' complaint.
By this action, the employees principally seek to obtain a
determination as to their right to have work for certain minimum hours. One theory of the complaint, based upon section
125 of the charter of the city and county, is that every operating employee is entitled to receive compensation for a
minimum of eight hours of work in each working day. An
alternative theory is that section 151.3 of the charter, which
establishes a method of computing wages based upon the wage
schedules of certain other street railway systems, requires
the consideration of any minimum wage guarantees included
in such schedules.
According to the stipulated facts, the streetcars and coaches
of the municipal railway are operated over designated routes
on schedules arranged by the manager of utilities and approved by the public utilities commission. These schedules
have "straight time" runs, which require the continuous
services of an operator for a period which may be more or
less than eight hours, and ''split time'' runs, during which
there is a period when the operator is off duty. "Split time"
runs vary in the number of hours worked as well as in their
total elapsed time, termed ''range time,'' which generally
is less than 10 hours. "vVork assignments are made on the
basis of selection by the employees, in order of seniority.
It is necessary from the standpoint of satisfactory operation of the municipal railway and a usual practice among
street railways throughout the country to employ more operators than there are runs. Standby employees must be avail-
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able in case of absences and to handle unforeseen demands
for increased transportation facilities. 'fhe employees who
supply these needs are those who, for one reason or another,
do not have a regular run.
An extra employee is assigned to the division headquarters
he selects. He is required to report at a designated time
to a dispatcher who assigns him to the run of an absentee,
or to a location at which he collects fares from passengers
as they board a car or bus. In the event that no work is
available, the dispatcher may designate a later report time,
or he may dispense with the employee's services for that day.
An operator who is given no work on a particular day is
entitled to compensation for the time he spent in reporting. ·
Although some of the men on the extra list do not have work
for eight hours each day, it is the policy of the manager of
utilities to assign duties to the extent that, throughout the
period of two weeks, each employee shall have received compensation equivalent to the wages he would have earned had
he worked 40 hours per week.
The 1present action primarily concerns these extra men.
However, the complaint indicates that it is intended to present
the rights of some of the operators assigned to regular runs
of less than eight hours per day.
Five causes of action were pleaded. Two of them were
determined adversely to the employees in the trial court and
they are no longer in issue.
In the first count, based upon section 125 of the city charter,
the employees seek a writ of mandate to compel the manager
of utilities to approve and transmit to the civil service commission payrolls crediting each employee with a minimum of
eight hours of work for each working day. By the fourth
count, they ask the court to compel the civil service commission to certify to the board of supervisors a wage schedule
which guarantees minimum wages and hours af employment
for the operating personnel. The fifth count reiterates the
allegations of the preceding ones and seeks a declaratory
judgment in accordance with them. The appeal of the city
officials and the intervener is from a judgment in favor of
the employees upon each of these causes of action.
The appellants take the position that section 125 of the
charter provides only a formula for the payment of overtime
and docs not establish maximum or minimum hours of work.
Furthermore, they argue, the judgment is too uncertain in
its terms to be capable of enforcement. The respondent
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employees are without standing to bring this action, the
appellants also assert, and the city ofiicials named in the
judgment are not the proper parties against whom such
a judgment may be given.
Since 1925, section 125 of the char.ter has read in part
as follows: ''Persons employed as platform men or bus
operators in the operating department of the municipal railway system shall be subject to the following conditions of
employment: The basic hours of labor shall be eight hours,
to be completed within ten consecutive hours; there shall lw
one day of rest in each week of seven days; all labor performed
in excess of eight hours in any one day, or six days in any
one week, shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half.''
According to the respondents, this provision guarantees the
employees eight hours of work within a range of 10 hours
upon six days of each week, with pay for eight hours even
if the work assignment is for less than that time on any
particular day. The city contends that the only purpose of
section 125 is to specify the rate of pay for all hours in excess
of eight within 10 hours and for those worked after the
expiration of 10 hours in any one day.
The charter provision does nothing more than to specify
the basis of compensation for employees. It declares that
overtime shall be paid for all work done after eight hours
and also after the lapse of 10 hours of actual service. Labor
performed in excess of six days in any one week must be paid
for at the rate of time and one-half.
[l] The requirements of a statute are directory, not mandatory, unless means be provided for its enforcement. [2] The
charter includes no means of enforcing the requirement that
all labor performed in excess of eight hours in any one day, all
labor performed after the span of 10 hours in any one day,
and all labor performed in excess of six days in any one
week "shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half."
No requirement is laid upon the city to pay for eight hours
of work on a given day or 48 hours per week regardless of
the duties performed.
The same construction was placed upon a federal statute
which declared that "eight hours shall constitute a day's
work for all laborers, workmen. and mechanics now employed,
or who may be hereafter employed, by or on behalf of the
government of the United States." (Act of June 25, 1868,
ch. 72; 15 Stats.L. 77.) This legislation, said the court,
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constituted only a direction by the government to its agents,
and not a prohibition of the making of contracts which fixed
a different length of time for daily service; ''the government
officer is not prohibited . . . from agreeing, when it is proper,
that a less number of hours than eight shall be accepted as
a day's work." (United States v. Martin, 94 U.S. 400, 403
[24 L.Ed. 128].) A Massachusetts law was similarly interpreted. (Woods v. City of Woburn, 220 Mass. 416 [107 N.E.
985, Ann.Cas. 1917A 492].)
The respondents rely upon Chatfield v. City of Seattle,
198 Wash. 179 [88 P.2d 582, 121 A.L.R. 1279] ; Goss v. Jttstice of District Court of Holyoke, 302 Mass. 148 [18 N.E.2d
546]; and Graham v. City of New York, 167 N.Y. 85 [60
N.E. 331]. The opinion in none of them states the language
of the statute or ordinance being considered, and the court's
conclusions necessarily were based upon the legislation
before it.
[3] In 1924 and 1925, when section 125 of the charter
was amended, section 33 of article XVI declared : ''No
deputy, clerk, or other employee of the City and County
shall be paid for a greater time than that covered by his
actual service. " 1 It is reasonable to conclude that if the
purpose of the proponents of the amendment was to change
that basic provision, the new section would have so stated
in no uncertain terms. The failure to do so shows a legislative intent to specify a basis of compensation for railroad
workers not in conflict with the existing mandate of the
charter prohibiting payment for service not performed.
[ 4] Another provision of the old charter provided for
the wages and hours of labor of employees of railroads which
operated under franchises granted by the city and county.
It read: "Every franchise shall provide that employees of
the person or company or corporation operating a street railroad shall be paid not less than three dollars a day and that
eight hours shall be the maximum hours of labor in any calendar day, the same to be completed within ten hours; provided,
that nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit
overtime employment, wages for such employment to be paid
at one and one half times the said rate of wages proportionate
1
Section 33 was a part of the former charter from its inception
(Stats. 1899, ch. 2 of Res., p. 241, at p. 364) and continued therein,
unchanged, until that charter was superseded by the new charter in 1932.
It was carried into section 150 of the new charter, enlarged to include
officers. (Stats. 1931, ch. 56 of Res., p. 2973, at p. 3066.)
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to each hour of such extra service.' ' 2 (.Art. III, ch. 2, § 7b.)
This section in clear and unmistakable terms specifies a minimum wage and maximum hours of work, overtime employment
being allowed if paid for at time and one-half. With these
requirements laid upon railways privately owned, the omission from the 1925 amendment of similar provisions in regard
to the municipal railway may well be taken as evidence that
the new proposal was not intended to guarantee either a
particular amount of wages or a work day of a given number
of hours.
The city officials in charge of the municipal railway consistently have operated it with an administrative interpretation of the charter as prescribing no guarantee of wages or
hours of labor. .At the time the amendment was adopted,
the superintendent of the railway submitted a report to the
board of public works, then in charge of its operations, giving
an estimate of the railway's needs in terms of personnel
and wages. Shortly thereafter, at the superintendent's request, the president of Local 518, one of the sponsors of the
amendment, submitted a written analysis of it in which he
described the enactment as providing only a basis for compensation. 3
Following this correspondence, a number of conferences
were held, attended by city officials and representatives of
the men. .At that time the city attorney rendered an opinion
2
Added to the charter by the Statutes of 1911, ch. 25 of Res., p. 1661,
at p. 1694. It continued unchanged during the life of the former charter.
It was a part of that charter in 1924 and 1925.
""Our interpretation of the . . . [amendment] and also the opinion
of legal minds with whom we have consulted is that the stipulations
contained therein merely provide a basis of compensation and do not
prevent the performance of any labor beyond the limitations described.
''Supplementary to our opinion we refer you to the Adamson Eight
Hour Law for Trainmen which while not identical, is in many respects
similar to Charter Amendment No. 21.
"We might also refer you to employment in many industries where
the hours of labor must he stretched over a range that will supply the
requirements of all concerned; in which event, the employer is subject
to a penalty similar to that affixed by Amendment No. 21.
"As an illustration of our opinion as to how the law would apply
where the ten hour limit as set forth in the Amendment has been exceeded
. . . the crew working run [15A] shall be paid straight time for work
actually performed . . . 7 hours and 5 minutes, and, for all work actually
performed beyond the ten hours range, which [will be] . . . 4 7 minutes,
they shall be paid at the rate of time and one-half of one hours and
eleven minutes; making a total of 8 hours and 16 minutes.
'' 'l'he other feature of the amendment relative to one day of rest in
seven may be construed in this manner.
"You will note that the amendment establishes eight hours as being
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in which
said in
"Most legislation limiting the
hours of employees and restricting the number of days a
week upon which labor may be performed, is adopted upon
the theory that the shortening of time of labor promotes the
health and comfort of the employe, and therefore, produces
greater efficiency. But it is manifest from the very language
of section 20 that it does not restrict the hours of labor for
that reason. It creates a basic day and a basic week for
the purpose of fixing compensation.''
Shortly thereafter, the board of public works adopted a
resolution directing the superintendent of the railway to
arrange the schedules so that no platform man or bus operator would be employed on the seventh consecutive day
(except men on the extra list who had worked less than 48
hours in six days; all work on the seventh day to be paid
for at time and one-half) ; that a minimum of overtime would
be required of an employee who worked eight hours in any
given day; and to fix 11 hours as the maximum range to
be used.
In 1932, the manager of the railway issued a bulletin which
stated: "Commencing Monday, April 25, . . . no allowance
will be made in the way of overtime for runs which extend
beyond a range of ten (10) hours." This rule was revoked
by a new bulletin issued in 1935 which allowed overtime
"for runs which extend beyond a range of ten ( 10) hours."
·william H. Scott, now general manager of the railway,
testified that from 1917 until the creation of the present
public utilities commission in 1932, he represented the railway
in all labor negotiations. During that period of time, he
said, he was never confronted with any demands based upon
a guaranteed eight-hour day. The first time such a demand
was made by any employee of the railway was in the spring
of 1949.
F'rom 1932 to 1945, Edward G. Cahill was manager of
utilities. In that capacity it was his duty to certify payrolls
of the railway. He testified that the 1932 bulletin did not
come to his attention until sometime after its issuance, and
the basic day and that therefor an employee working less than eight hours
in any one day is not subject to this portion of the Amendment and
may be permitted to work on the seventh day at straight time.
''This may continue until such employee has worked 208 hours which
is equivalent to 26 eight hour days, after which, the overtime rate shall
prevail.
''Providing that the time consumed in putting in the 208 hours shall
have exceeded 26 days in one month."
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late in 1934 he was approached by union representatives
concerning it. After investigation he recommended to the
public utilities commission that it be changed. The bulletin
of 1935 was then issued.
During those discussions with the union representatives,
Cahill said, no claim was made by them that the men were
entitled to an eight-hour day by virtue of the charter provision. Henry S. Foley, employed by the municipal railway
for approximately 33 years preceding 1951, was one of those
representatives. According to his testimony, in 1946 the city
and county controller notified the railway management they
would have to discontinue paying for "dead time"; at that
time operators whose runs finished within 15 minutes of
eight hours were paid for the full eight hours. Subsequently,
Foley requested reinstatement of the practice of allowing
eight hours' pay for such runs.
William H. McRobbie, who has been an employee of the
municipal railway for a number of years and a member of
the same union as Mr. Foley, testified as to negotiations with
city officials concerning the wage schedules. A committee
of which he was a member met the mayor and the city attorney
and discussed the question as to the legality of payment for
work performed in excess of 10 consecutive hours. At that
time, McRobbie said, the city attorney orally stated that, in
his opinion, payment for such services was a legal charge
against the city. Two weeks later, the 1935 bulletin restoring range time was issued. Asked if at that meeting there
was any assertion that the men, by virtue of the charter,
were afforded a guarantee of eight hours a day, he said, "No,
there was no assertion that . . . all the men would be guaranteed eight hours a day; however, we did contend that the
regular runs should be eight hours and any work performed
in excess of the ten hours spread should be paid for at the
rate of time and a half; that was all that was discussed."
[5] The employees attach some significance to two items
which they suggest show an administrative interpretation in
favor of an eight-hour guaranteed workday. In March, 1935,
the superintendent of the municipal railway wrote a letter to
the then acting mayor of San Francisco in regard to the
provisions of the new amendment to the charter. In estimated costs for an average month, the superintendent included: ''Cost for time allowed for runs under eight hours,
$2,898.23. This item does not enter into Amendment 21."
The city explains this statement as having reference to man-
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agement 's established practice prior to 1946 of paying a full
eight hours' pay for a regular run of seven hours and 45
minutes. This seems to be the only reasonable inference that
can be drawn from the statement in view of the low amount
stated, and the interpretations of the amendment by the city
attorney and by the president of Local 518 at about the
same time.
The second item consists of an unsigned memorandum dated
September 4, 1925, entitled "Municipal Railway, San Francisco, data re working conditions of platform men." This
memorandum was prepared in response to a written request
from another transit company and consists of a short summary of working conditions before and after the effective
date of the amendment to the charter. The memorandum
includes the following: ''Previous to Charter amendment,
schedules were made out on an eight hour day with no limits
as to range, except that they were kept as near ten hours
as possible. All reg~tlar runs under eight hours were paid
full eight hours and time and one-half was paid for all time
beyond eight hours and twenty minutes. Number of hours
after Charter amendment 21? Conditions same as above,
except that overtime is paid after eight hours instead of
after eight hours and twenty minutes, and one [and one-]
half time is also allowed after the ten hour range. . . . ''
(Emphasis added.) The statement concerning eight hours'
pay for all regular runs should be read in the light of the
practice then in force of treating a regular run of seven
hours and 45 minutes as the equivalent of a full eight hours
regular run. Certainly, this does not support the finding
that the ''administrative construction adhered to throughout
the years of Section 125 of the Charter is not in contravention
of petitioner's construction."
The respondents contend, however, that even if section 125
does not guarantee to them a minimum working day, they
are entitled to it under section 151.3 4 which requires that
•The portion of the section relating to municipal railway employees
provides:
''Notwithstanding the provisions of section 151 or any other provisions of this charter the wages of platform employees and bus operators
of the municipal railway shall be determined and fixed, annually, as
follows:
"(A) On or before the second Monday of July of each year the civil
service commission shall certify to the board of supervisors the two
highest wage schedules in effect on July 1st of that year for platform
employees and bus operators of other street railway systems in the State
of California;
'' (B) The board of supervisors shall thereupon fix wage schedules for
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the wages of platform employees and bus operators of the
municipal railway be fixed annually at the average of ''the
two highest wage schedules in effect on July 1st of that year
for platform employees and bus operators of other street railway systems in the State of California." It is argued that
"the average of the two highest wage schedules" includes
the right to receive any guarantee of wages or hours included
in such schedules.
The whole of section 151.3 is a qualification of section 151,
which empowers the board of supervisors "to fix by ordinance from time to time . . . all salaries, wages and compensations . . . of all officers and employees" of the city and
county. According to section 151.3, where there is established "a rate of pay for . . . groups or crafts through collective bargaining agreements with employers employing such
groups or crafts, and such rate is recognized and paid throughout the industry and the establishments employing such
groups or crafts in San Francisco,'' the civil service commission must certify to the board of supervisors the prevailing
rates. ''The board of supervisors shall thereupon revise the
rates of pay for such crafts or groups accordingly."
[6] But the wages of the employees of the municipal railway cannot be fixed by that formula. For some years, nearly
all of the public transportation service in San Francisco has
been performed by the municipal railway, and, accordingly,
there was no "prevailing rate of pay" established for street
railway employees within the city and county. To set up
a standard of wages, the second part of section 151.3 was
added to provide a method of computing compensations based
platform employees and bus operators of the municipal railway which
shall be the average of the two highest wage schedules so certified by the
civil service commission; provided, if the average of the two highest wage
schedules shall be less than the rates of pay fixed for such service in the
salary standardization ordinance adopted by the board of supervisors
on March 18, 1946, the board of supervisors shall fix wage schedules
for such service which shall be the same as the rates :fixed for such service
in the said ordinance ;
"(C) When, in addition to their usual duties, such employees are
assigned duties of instructors of platform employees or bus operators
they shall receive twenty (20c) cents per hour above the rates of pay
fixed for platform employees and bus operators as herein provided;
"(D) The rates of pay so :fixed for platform employees and bus oper·
a tors as herein provided shall be effective from July 1st of the fiscal year
in which such rates of pay are certified by the civil service commission;
'' (E) Platform employees and bus operators shall be paid one and
one-half times the rate of pay :fixed as herein provided for all work
performed on six days specified as holidays by ordinance of the board
of supervisors for such employees.''
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upon the average of the two highest wage schedules of other
street railways in California. In effect, this portion of section 151.3 represents a further qualification of the general
structure of wage and pay determinations, applicable to a
specific group of employees of the city and county.
[7] The appellants draw a distinction between the two portions of sectionl51.3 from the use of the term "rate of pay" in
the earlier part, as distinguished from "wages" and "wage
schedules" in the portion relating specifically to municipal
railway employees. Although a distinction between those
terms has been made (see Giannettino v. McGoldrick, 295
N.Y. 208 [66 N.E.2d 57, 59]; Jung v. City of New York,
76 N.Y.S.2d 235), clearly it was not intended here. The
provisions relating· to municipal railway employees use both
"rate of pay" and "wages," apparently interchangeably.
(Of. subsections B, C, D, and E.) Both parts are aimed
at providing standards of compensation for particular groups
of city and county employees, and vary only as to the methods
used in determining them.
In Adams v. Wolff, 84 Cal.App.2d 435 [190 P.2d 665],
the constitutionality of section 151.3 was upheld. There,
the question before the court was whether, in determining
prevailing rates of pay for groups and crafts, the civil service
commission was required to include pay for holidays and
premium pay for night work. It was argued by the city that
the section contemplates only a basic rate of pay and was
not intended to govern >vorking conditions. The court said:
"It is probably true that section 151.3 relates only to the
'basic' rate of pay and does not relate to 'working conditions.' But that in no way assists defendants. It is quite
apparent that it was the intent of section 151.3 to give to
the public employees of the type here involved the same
take home pay received by private employees in the same
industry. That means that when the public employees work
on a night shift, or where a work week is interrupted by a
holiday they are to receive the same pay that private employees would receive for work similarly performed. It is
quite obvious that night shift pay and pay for holidays is
a part of the 'basic' rate of pay, and is as much a part of
the wage structure as the hourly wage itself." (Pp. 444-445.)
Subsequently, in Adams v. City & County of San Francisco, 94 Cal.App.2d 586 [211 P.2d 368, 212 P.2d 272], the
court considered the question of whether, under the general
provisions of section 151.3, the right of employees to vaca-
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tions and to sick and disability leaves was to be governed
by the "prevailing rate of pay" of similar groups and crafts
in the industry. It was held that the right to sick and disability leave was governed by other specific sections of the
charter. But, on the authority of Adams v. Wolff, the court
concluded that vacation pay, too, is an item of take home
pay as defined in the earlier decision.
In both of the Adams cases, the court equated "basic rate
of pay" with "take home pay," but did not attempt to
define either of those terms. It was recognized, however,
that the apparent purpose of the section is to provide a
method of computing the monetary remuneration to an employee, as distinguished from ''fringe benefits,'' or benefits
derived from working conditions. The difficulty lies in deciding whether a particular item is to be deemed "pay" or
some other type of benefit.
By the use of the word ''rate,'' the charter specifies a
!Vage schedule made up by the measurement of one item
on the basis of a unit or quantity of another. 5 As applied to
wages, it requires a computation of amount of compensation
for a unit of work, in the case of municipal workers, being
an hourly wage.
It is unnecessary to decide whether the Adams cases were
properly decided. Arguably, holiday pay and provisions for
paid vacations might be considered to be items required to
be included within a computation of "basic rate of pay,"
since ultimately, they have a bearing upon the amount of pay
received for time actually worked, and sound accounting
practice might require that they be so considered. However,
at least insofar as municipal railway workers are concerned,
specific provision for those items now is made by the charter.
( §§ 151.3 [E], 151.4, 151.5.)
[8] But a guarantee as to minimum hours of work does
not affect the rate of an employee's pay, that is, the amount
of compensation per unit of work. It deals only with the
number of hours of work to which an employee may claim
to be entitled. Such a provision is without the scope of a
charter section establishing a method of computing a basic
"rate of pay" for employees.
"Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1948) gives this
definition of the word "rate": "3. Quantity, amount, or degree of a
thing measured per unit of something else; . . . Amount of payment or
charge based on some other amount, as in money obligations; as, the rate
of wages per week; . . . "
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[9] This conclusion is strengthened by consideration of
the practical results of a contrary construction of the charter.
By section 151.3, the wages of municipal railway employees
must be computed annually on the basis of the two highest
wage schedules of other street railways in California established as of July 1st of each year. By section 150, payments
of wages for such guaranteed minimum hours may not be
made to an employee who did not work for that amount of
time. To pay each employee for a minimum of eight hours
per day, it would be necessary to revise the entire operating
schedule to provide work for such hours, and to revise it
continually with every change in guaranteed hours of those
wage schedules to which reference would be made. The evidence shows that, particularly in the case of extra men, such
realignment of schedules would be extremely difficult and
costly. Certainly there is no reasonable basis for holding
that, in adopting the charter section, the people intended
such a result.
[10] The respondents suggest that, instead of attempting
to effectuate any specific guarantee of hours, the city officials
should assign a monetary value to such a benefit and average
it with the wages stated in the schedules consulted. .Although
they recognize that such a process would require ''considerable consideration before an average could be struck between
diverse systems of guarantees and diverse wage provisions,''
they assert that if the sole purpose of the section were ''to
add two rates of pay, divide by two, and then establish the
result as the 'hourly rate of pay,' " there would be no need
to entrust that function to the board of supervisors, the
highest administrative agency of the city and county.
But if this contention were sustained, under like principles,
the board should place a money value upon all other benefits
received by employees under such schedules, and also upon
similar benefits guaranteed under the charter of the city and
county, and fix the wage schedule for the municipal railway
accordingly. Such a construction of the section would impose
the vast, if not impractical or impossible, burden upon the
board of evaluating an endless variety of benefits. [11] It is not
unreasonable to construe the charter as placing upon the
board a simple averaging process. It has the sole authority
to fix wages and salaries and, although it generally is vested
with wide discretion in computing them, section 151.3 is a
rlirect limitation upon that power. Moreover, in the first
part of section 151.3, the board is directed to revise the rates
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of pay of groups of crafts in accordance with the rates certified to it by the civil service commission, under circumstances
allowing no room for discretion.
In view of these conclusions, it is unnecessary to consider
the points raised by the appellants in regard to procedural
questions.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I adopt as my
concurring and dissenting opinion in this case the able and
well-reasoned opinion prepared by Justice '\Vood, which was
concurred in by Justices Peters and Bray, when this case
was before the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division One.
''The petitioners, permanent employees of the city and
county of San Francisco, platform men and bus operators in
the operating department of the municipal railway system,
brought this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all
other employees similarly situated, to determine a controversy over the interpretation and application of sections 125
and 151.3 of the city and county charter concerning hours
of work and rates of pay of such platform men and bus
operators.
''The action was brought against the manager of utilities
of the public utilities commission of the city and county,
members and the secretary of the civil service commission,
and the controller of San Francisco. They were designated
'respondents,' below. Joseph Robinson, a taxpayer of San
Francisco, intervened as a respondent on his own behalf,
and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated.
''The complaint contains five counts. In the first four counts
the petitioners seek writs of mandate; in the fifth count they
pray for declaratory relief.
''The trial court found for the petitioners on counts one,
four and five, and rendered judgment thereon in their favor.
The respondents, including the intervener, have appeared from
the judgment. 1
"In addition to the major questions of interpretation, appellants present these questions: Is the judgment uncertain and
1
''
Hereafter in this opinion, we will refer to the respondents as
'appellants' and to the petitioners as 'respondents' unless otherwise
indicated.
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contradictory in its several provisions? Are the respondents
in a position, have they the legal right, to raise the questions
which they present~ Is there a legal basis for viewing this
as a class suit 7 vVe will consider the major questions first.
"(1) In respect to hours of service and overtime, section
125 of the cha1·ter states that 'Persons employed as platform
men or bus operators in the operating department of the municipal railway system shall be subject to the following conditions of employment: The basic hours of labor shall be eight
hours, to be completed within ten consecutive hours; there
shall be one day of rest in each week of seven days; all labor
performed in excess of eight hours in any one day, or six days
in any one week, shall be paid for at the rate of time and
one-half.' (Stats. 1931, ch. 56 of Res., p. 2973, at 3050.)2
''This clause was first placed in the charter in 1925, by an
amendment adding section 20 to article XII of the former
charter. (Stats. 1925, ch. 10 of Res., p. 1159, at p. 1164.) It
then read as now except that in the introductory portion the
words 'shall receive' appeared where the words 'shall be subject to' now appear.
"Respondents interpret this cla?tse as prescribing for them
a workday of eight hours within a range of ten hours, guaranteeing them eight hours of work in ten hours upon six days
of each week, and awarding them pay for the full eight hours
in ten each day even if the work assignment on a particular
day covers a shorter period, such as three, four, or six hours.
''Appellants interpret this clause as a formula for the payment of overtime (not as a guarantee of eight hours of work
within a spread of ten each day), that it simply prescribes
overtime pay (time and one-half) for all hours worked in
excess of eight within ten hours and for all hours worked after
the expiration of the ten-hour range regardless of the number
of hours worked within the ten-hour range.
''The trial court found and declared that this clause provides
'that each petitioner and employee similarly situated should
receive and be paid for eight hours of work in each scheduled
working day, said eight hours of work to be completed within
ten consecutive hours after commencement of work, and . . .
that all labor performed in excess of eight hours in any one
day shall be compensated for at the rate of time and one-half
the rate of pay for such work.' (Finding IX, C.T. 71; Concl.
"•subsequent amendments of § 125 have made no changes in this
clause. (See Stats. 1941, p. 195, at 202; and p. 3250, at p. 3251.)
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of Law, (a) substantially the same, C.'r. 85) ; that the 'purpose and intent of section 125 was to enable the employees of
the Railway to complete a
of
hours of work within
ten hours.' (Finding XX, C.'l'. 82; Concl. of Law, (k)
C.T. 90.)
"The judgment directs the issuance of a writ of mandate
commanding appellant Turner,
of the Public utilities
Commission of San Francisco, to approve and transmit to the
appellant civil service commission time rolls or pay rolls showing 'that each petitioner and employee similarly situated is
credited for at least eight ( 8) hours of work on each scheduled
workday, in which each petitioner and employee similarly
situated: (a) reports for work, and (b) performs each and
every street car, bus or operating assignment designated
within ten hours after reporting for said work . . .' ( J udgment, (1) C.T. 94-95; follOV\'S Conel. of r,aw, (e), C.'l'. 86-87.)
The judgment also declares that 'each petitioner and employee
similarly situated is entitled to wages for at least eight ( 8)
hours of work performed by each petitioner and employee
similarly situated on each scheduled workday, in which each
petitioner and employee similarly situated: ( 1) has reported
for work, and (2) has performed each and every street car,
bus or operating assignment designated within ten hours after
reporting for said work' (C. T. 95; follows Concl. of I1aw,
C.T. 85).
''We do not find in this clause any guaranty of eight hours
work per day, nor any guaranty of eight hours pay pe1· day.
It is neither a minimum nor a minimum-maximum hour or
wage per day provision.
''This clause is so clear and cogent in its wording, we find
it difficult to express its meaning in other words than those
which it uses. Tt starts with the statement: 'The basic hours
of labor shall be eight hours, to be completed within ten consrcntive hours.' Basic 3 for what? \Vt) may reasonably expect
to find that out latrr on in the sentence. Without more, we
have nothing bnt a formula: Hight hours in ten. Next it says,
'tl1ere shall be one clay of rest in each week of seven days.'
This, too, is a formula; one day in seven. Next come the words
that give significance to these formulae. They tell us the use
we mnst make of these formulae: 'all labor performed in
3
''
'Basic' means: Of or pertaining to the base or essence; fundamenta 1; as, a lxtsic fact; constituting a basis; as, a basic wage. (Web
ster 's New International Dictionary, 2d ed.)
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excess of eight hours in any one day, or six days in any one
week, shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half.' These
formulae are to be used in ascertaining what is overtime. Use
of the first formula indicates that labor performed 'in excess
of eight hours in any one day,' comprehends all work done
after the lapse of ten hours as well as all work done after
eight hours of actual service. The second formula operates
in similar fashion. All labor performed 'in excess of . . .
six days in any one week [all work done on the day of rest],'
must be paid for at time and one-half. With this, each formula
exhausts its function. The charter requires no further use of it.
"Let us make another approach. It is a familiar principle
of statutory interpretation that a declaration in a statute is
directory, not mandatory, unless means be provided for its
enforcement. The only means of enforcement here provided is
the requirement that all labor performed in excess of eight
hours in any one day, all labor performed after the span of
ten hours in any one day, and all labor performed in excess
of six days in any one week (all work done on the day of
rest) 'shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half.'
Nothing is said about paying for labor not performed if a
person's hours of work on a given day fall short of eight hours
or fall short of eight hours within a span of ten or are less than
48 hours upon six days of a given week. We can but conclude
that this clause was not intended to require payment for
labor not performed, was not intended to guarantee eight
hours of work per day, was not intended to guarantee eight
hours of pay per day.
''Persuasive of this view is the interpretation made by
the Supreme Court of the United States, of a federal statute
which declared that 'eight hours shall constitute a day's work
for all laborers, workmen, and mechanics now employed, or
who may be hereafter employed, by or on behalf of the
government of the United States.' (Act of June 25, 1868,
ch. 72; 15 Stat.L. 77.) The court deemed this but a direction
by the government to its agents and not a prohibition of
the making of contracts which fixed a different length of time
for a day's work. The court said 'the government officer is
not prohibited . . . from agreeing, when it is proper, that
a less number of hours than eight shall be accepted as a day's
work.' (United. States v. Martin, 94 U.S. 400, at 403 [24
L.Ed. 128] ; followed in 1915 by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Woods v. City of Woburn, 220 Mass. 416 [107
N.E. 985, Ann.Cas. 1917A 492], interpreting a similar state
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statute.) Respondents cite three cases in support of their
interpretation of section 125. (Chatfield v. City of Seattle,
198 Wash. 179 [88 P.2d 582, 121 A.L.R. 1279]; Goss v. Justice
of District Court of Holyoke, 302 Mass. 148 [18 N.E.2d 546] ;
and Graham v. City of New York, 167 N.Y. 85 [60 N.E.
331] .) But those cases are not helpful. In none of them is the
precise text of the significant provision of the salary and
hours fixing statute or ordinance completely furnished. In
the Goss case, none of it is furnished. In the Chatfield case
only the hours per day feature ('Eight hours shall constitute
a day's work'), not the wage feature, is given .. The decision
as printed does not give that portion of the ordinance which
implemented this declaration concerning hours of work. This
declaration, standing alone, unaided by an enforcement feature, would be directory, not mandatory. There must have
been something in the ordinance which made it mandatory.
In the Graham case the court did not quote the statute. It
did say that 'the salary was $1,200 a year, payable in equal
monthly installments.' That bears no similarity to our section
125.
"Let us also examine the city and county charter as it read
in 1924 and 1925, during the time when this amendment to
that charter was written, presented to the voters of San
Francisco, and considered and approved by the Legislature
of the state.
''We find one feature of the charter which was particularly
significant. Section 33 of article XVI declared: 'No deputy,
clerk, or other employee of the City and County shall be paid
for a greater time than that covered by his actual service. ' 4
''If the proponents of the 1925 amendment desired to
require payment of eight hours of pay per day even though
on a given day a fewer number of hours of labor be performed, they should have said so in no uncertain terms, in
order to negative the prohibition of no pay 'for a greater time
than that covered by his actual service' declared in section
33 of article XVI of the very charter being amended. The
fact they did not do so is persuasive of the view that they
harbored no intent to make such a requirement.
''Another provision of the old charter similarly serves as
"•section 33 was a part of the former charter from its inception
(Stat. 1899, ch. 2 of Res., p. 241 at p. 364) and continued therein,
unchanged, until that charter was superseded by the new charter in
1932. It was carried into section 150 of the new charter, enlarged to
include officers. (Stats. 1931, ch. 56 of Res., p. 2973, at p. 3066.)
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an aid to interpretation. 'vVe refer to section 7b of chapter
2 of article III. It was one of a number of sections which
dealt with street railway franchises granted by the city and
county. They were added to the charter in 1911. Section 7b
declared : 'Every franchise shall provide that employees of the
person or company or corporation operating a street railroad
shall be paid not less than three dollars a day and that eight
hours shall be the maximum hours of labor in any calendar
day, the same to be completed within ten hours; provided,
that nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit
overtime employment, wages for such employment to be paid
at one and one half times the said rate of wages proportionate
to each hour of such extra service. ' 5 Here we have in clear
and unmistakable terms a minimum wage and maximum
hours provision, followed by permission for overtime employment if paid for at time and one-half. With such a
provision already in the charter, concerning street railways
privately owned, its omission from the 1925 amendment, concerning street railways publicly owned, suggests that the
sponsors of that amendment intentionally avoided, studiously
avoided, writing into their proposal either a guaranteed wage
or a guaranteed hours per day provision.
"Let us next consider the interpretation given this clause
of the 1925 amendment by the ofiicials charged with its administration, and by their legal adviser, before this controversy arose and this question reached the courts for consideration and determination.
"The concurrent resolution approving this amendment to
the charter was filed with the Secretary of State, January
27, 1925 ( Stats. 1925, p. 1159), and took effect on that date
(Pol. Code, § 324; now Gov. Code, § 9602).
"Meanwhile (January 16, 1925), Superintendent F. Boeken
reported to the board of public works (then in charge of the
municipal railway) that schedules for all lines had been practically completed to meet the requirements of the new charter
amendment. He estimated that of the 980 platform men
required, 348 would be extra men, and estimated that the
earnings of the latter would be reduced from $153 to $90
per month.
"Frank B. Halling, during that period, was president of
Local 518 of the Amalgamated Street Railway Employees of
5
''
Added to the charter by the Statutes of 1911, ch. 25 of Res., p.
1661, at p. 1694. It continued unchanged during the life of the former
charter. It was a part of that charter in 1924 and 1925.
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America. March 10, 1925, he wrote Superintendent Boeken,
at the latter's request, giving his interpretation of the new
amendment. 6 He said in part' Our interpretation of the foregoing [ § 20 of art. XII of the charter] and also the opinion
of legal minds with whom we have consulted is that the stipulations contained therein merely provide a basis of compensation and do not prevent the performance of any labor beyond
the limitations described.
'' 'Supplementary to our opinion we refer you to the Adamson Eight Hour Law for Trainmen which while not identical,
is in many respects similar to Charter Amendment No. 21.
" 'We might also refer you to employment in many industries where the hours of labor must be stretched over a range
that will supply the requirements of all concerned; in which
event, the employer is subject to a penalty similar to that
affixed by Amendment No. 21.
" 'As an illustration of our opinion as to how the law
would apply where the ten hour limit as set forth in the
Amendment has been exceeded we present a few examples
where runs exceed said limit :
" 'Run 15-A, reports at 7:49 A. M. relieved at 11:19 A. 111:.
first part; reports for second part at 2:14 P. l\II. and finishes
at 6:36 P. M.
" 'Here you will find that from 7 :49 A. l\L until 5 :49 P. M.
is the ten hour range.
" 'The law provides that the crew working said run shall
be paid straight time for work actually performed therein;
which is in this instance, 7 hours and 5 minutes, and, for all
work actually performed beyond the ten hour range, which
in this particular case is 47 minutes, they shall be paid at
the rate of time and one-half or one hour and 11 minutes;
making a total of 8 hours and 16 minutes.
" 'Tripper runs would be treated in the same manner.
"'36-J, reports at 6:20 A. M. off at 8:37 A. M., reports for
second part at 3 :09 P. 111:. off at 6 :03 P. l\L
'' '6 :20 A. M. to 4 :20 P. M. being the ten hour range, straight
time prevails for all labor performed therein; which is 3 hours
and 36 minutes, and the overtime rate prevails for labor performed between 4 :20 P. M. and 6 :03 P. llf., which is 1 hour
and 43 minutes; computed at the overtime rate is 2 hours and
34 minutes, making a total for this run of 6 hours and 11
minutes.
""The parties stipulated that the San Francisco Labor Council was
one of the sponsors of the 1925 amendment.
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'' 'The other feature of the amendment relative to one
day of rest in seven may be construed in this manner.
" 'You will note that the amendment establishes eight hours
as being the basic day and that therefor (e) an employee working less than eight hours in any one day is not subject to this
portion of the Amendment and may be permitted to work on
the seventh day at straight time.
'' 'This may continue until such employee has worked 208
hours which is equivalent to 26 eight hour days, after which,
the overtime rate shall prevail.
'' 'Providing that the time consumed in putting in the
208 hours shall have exceeded 26 days in one month.'
"During March and the early part of April a number of
conferences, attended by Superintendent Boeken and other
city officials and representatives of the men, were held in
an endeavor to work out a satisfactory method of operation
under the new amendment. April 15, 1925, in response to
a series of questions propounded by the board of public works,
the city attorney rendered an opinion in which he said in
part : 'Most legislation limiting the hours of employes and
restricting the number of days a week upon which labor
may be performed, is adopted upon the theory that the
shortening of time of labor promotes the health and comfort
of the employe, and therefore, produces greater efficiency.
But it is manifest from the very language of section 20 that
it does not restrict the hours of labor for that reason. It
creates a basic day and a basic week for the purpose of fixing
compensation. It is expressly declared:
'' ' ''The basic hours of labor shall be eight hours to be
completed within ten consecutive hours; there shall be one
day of rest in each week of seven days. All labor performed
in excess of eight hours in any one day or six days in any
one week shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half."
'' 'Therefore, it was manifestly the intention of the framers
of this section of the charter that the men should be allowed
to work in excess of the basic hours, but that in the event
that they did work they should receive extra compensation.
It is meaningless to provide a restriction upon the hours of
actual labor when in the same sentence, it is expressly declared
that all labor performed in excess of eight hours in any one
day or six days in any one week shall be paid for at the
rate of time and one-half. The act forbidding females to
work more than eight hours in twenty-four is direct and
positive with no provision for the payment of any overtime
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and prescribes a penalty for its violation. (Statutes 1911,
page 437.) So are all similar acts prescribing the limitations
upon the right to labor.'
"He was further of the opinion that the provision that
'the basic hours of labor shall be eight hours, to be completed
within ten consecutive hours' did not prevent the persons
referred to from performing their work within a period of
time in excess of ten hours; also, that it would be lawful for
a platform man who had worked 8 hours a day for six consecutive days, to work on the seventh day, and that the same
was true of a man who worked less than 48 hours during that
six day period; and that 'the employe is entitled under the
said section to time and one-half for any and all time after
the period of ten consecutive hours has elapsed during which
time he has actually worked,' and 'the employe who works
on the seventh day is entitled to time and one-half.'
"April 24, 1925, the board of public works adopted a resolution directing the superintendent of the railway to so arrange the schedules that no platform man or bus operator
be employed on the seventh consecutive day (except men
on the extra list who had worked less than 48 hours in six
days; all work on the seventh day to be paid for at time
and one half) ; to so arrange the schedules that a minimum
of overtime would be required of an employee who worked
eight hours in any given day; and to fix eleven hours as the
maximum range to be used. In that resolution the board
recited in part that 'the City Attorney in answer to the
inquiries of this Board expresses as his opinion that the terms
of the charter amendment recently ratified by the Legislature
pertaining to the Municipal Railway, do not prohibit the
employment of platform men or bus operators on the seventh
consecutive day, nor in excess of eight hours in any given
day, nor beyond a range of ten hours in any given day,
provided that in case said employee is employed on said seventh day, or in excess of said eight hours, or outside a range
of the said ten hours, he must be paid time and one-half
therefor' and that "the amendment referred to was drafted
and presented by the members of Division No. 518 of the
Amalgamated Street Railways Employees of America, who
were particular to have incorporated therein the following:
''There shall be one day of rest in each week of seven days.'' '
"Thus, it appears that at the very beginning of operations
under the new charter amendment in 1925, the officials
charged with its administration and enforcement, their legal
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adviser, and the representatives of the platform men and bus
operators interpreted its provisions substantially the same as
do the appellants herein.
''Has there been any material change in that interpretation,
over the years, upon the part of the administrative officials~
The evidence indicates there has been no such change. At
the trial, the parties entered into a stipulation setting forth
the significant facts concerning the establishment of routes
for the operation of street cars and motor coach or trolley
coach lines, the working schedule, runs necessary to service
the routes, the 'general sign-up,' 'extra lists' of men, and
other related matters, descriptive of the method of operating
this railway as of the time of trial. The facts so stipulated
reflect no change of administrative interpretation from that
adopted early in 1925. The stipulation is too long for inclusion in this opinion. The following excerpt will serve to
illustrate the administrative interpretation which the facts
recited reflect: '(10) At the Geneva and Ocean Avenue
Headquarters, all of the employees on the extra list are required to remain on report time, and during a time when
a run is not yet available, and are paid for said period of
time at the straight time rate for not less than two hours
and for such additional time at said rate as may be required
by the Dispatcher for report time . . . . [Similar provisions
concerning other headquarters] . . . On occasions, it occurs
that a man on the extra list at one Headquarters is needed
at another, in which event said man is sent by Management
from the former to the latter, with his traveling time compensated for at the legal rate; (11) Some of the men on the
extra list are not afforded an opportunity by the Municipal
Railway to work eight hours a day. The management of
said Railway, including Respondent Turner and the Public
Utilities Commission of the City and County of San Francisco, have, for some time last past, maintained and now
pursue the policy of providing for work for men upon the
extra list to the extent that each man thereon obtains a
minimum, throughout a period of two weeks, of pay representing forty hours per week, although said man (referring
to "some of the men," as above stated in line 23), are ready
and desirous of working eight hours a day. ' 7
7
' ' The evidence shows a marked unevenness in rider demand each day.
It is extremely high in the morning between 7:20 and 8:40 and in the
evening between 4:55 and 5:30. In consequence, by 7 p. m. two-thirds
of the equipment is withdrawn from service and by midnight demand is
extremely low.
·
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"Concerning the continuity ·of administrative interpretation over the years, 1925-1951, some evidence was adduced
at the trial. April 23, 1932, Fred Boeken, manager of the
municipal railway, issued a bulletin which stated: 'Commencing Monday, April 25, 1932, no allowance will be made
in the way of overtime for runs which extend beyond a
range of ten (10) hours.' April 29, 1935, these provisions
were revoked by a new bulletin issued by the manager, reading as follows: 'Commencing Wednesday, May 1, 1935, overtime will be allowed for runs which extend beyond a range
of ten (10) hours.' William H. Scott, now general manager
of the municipal railway (from 1913 to 1935 he was auditor)
produced the record which contained these bulletins. He
testified that from 1917 until the creation of the present
public utilities commission in 1932, he represented the municipal railway in all labor negotiations. Mr. Bullock represented
the board of supervisors and Mr. Hammond the board of
public works. That was before and after 1925. During that
period of time he was never confronted with any demands to
the effect that the workmen on this railway were guaranteed
an eight-hour day. The first time that he realized that a
demand was being made by any employee of the railway
to the effect that the charter guaranteed him an eight-hour
day was in the spring of 1949 at a meeting in Mr. Turner's
office, attended also by three or four union representatives.
Edward G. Cahill was manager of utilities from April 1,
1932, until October, 1945. In that capacity he certified payrolls upon the municipal railway. In performing that function he was mindful of the requirement of section 150 of
the new charter that 'No officer or employee shall be paid
for a greater time than that covered by his actual service,'
and abided by it. He testified that the 1932 bulletin which
;we have quoted did not come to his attention until sometime
after its issuance. In late 1934 he was approached by union
representatives concerning it. He investigated the situation,
took it up with the public utilities commission and recommended that it be changed. This resulted in the above quoted
bulletin of 1935. During those discussions with the union
representatives, Cahill said, no claim was made by them that
the men were entitled to an eight-hour day by virtue of the
charter provision. Henry S. Foley, an employee of the municipal railway for approximately 33 years preceding 1951,
was one of those representatives. He testified that in 1946
42 C.2d-ll
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the city and county controller notified the railway management they would have to discontinue paying for 'dead time';
at that time operators whose runs finished at 7 :45, and so on,
up to eight hours were paid a full eight hours' pay. Subsequently, Foley requested reinstatement of the practice of
allowing eight hours' pay for such runs.
"William H. McRobbie, engaged in various employments
on the municipal railway over the years, a member of the
same union as Mr. Foley, testified that he was active in
the union in 1932, and following, to restore the range time,
overtime pay for work done after the ten-hour span. Finally,
his committee met with Mr. Cahill, the mayor, and the city
attorney. There was a discussion as to whether it was legal
to pay this penalty time for any work performed in excess
of ten hours' spread. The city attorney orally stated that
in his opinion it was legal. That meeting was about two
weeks before the issuance of the 1935 bulletin restoring range
time. Asked if at that meeting there was any assertion that
the men, by virtue of the charter, were afforded a guarantee
of eight hours a day, he said 'No, there was no assertion that
the men, all the men would be guaranteed eight hours a day;
however, we did contend that the regular runs should be
eight hours and any work performed in excess of the ten
hours spread should be paid for at the rate of time and a
half; that was all that was discussed.' Concerning the regular
runs, he explained that the city and county had been giving
eight hours' pay for those runs which were in fact but seven
hours and 45 minutes; that after the range time was taken
away, the contention was being made by those who took it
away that the pay for such runs should be only for actual
time, seven hours and 45 minutes. He said that he and his
committee did refer to the charter 'in this respect: That
the implication was contained in that Charter amendment
that would pay time and a half for all work in excess of the
ten-hour spread; that was the main contention at that time';
that there was also talk 'for the restoration of that pay
between seven hours and forty-five minutes and eight hours.'
"Respondents attach some significance to two items which
they suggest show an administrative interpretation in favor
of an eight-hour guaranteed workday. The first of these
appears in a letter dated March 19, 1925, from Mr. Boeken,
then superintendent of the municipal railway, to Honorable
Ralph McLaren, then Acting Mayor of San Francisco, concerning the problem of complying with the provisions of
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Charter Amendment No. 21, the 1925 amendment. Concerning estimated costs for an average month, there was included
this item : 'Cost for time allowed for runs under eight hours,
$2,898.23. This item does not enter into Amendment 21.'
Appellants explain this statement by reference to management's established practice prior to 1946 of paying a full
eight hours' pay for a regular run of seven hours and 45
minutes. This seems the only reasonable inference that can
be drawn considering the relatively low monthly cost noted,
and in view of the interpretations made of the 1925 amendment by the city attorney in April and by Mr. Halling, president of Local 518, in March, 1925. The second item consists
of an unsigned memorandum dated September 4, 1925, entitled 'Municipal Railway, San Francisco, data re working
conditions of platform men.' This memorandum was prepared in response to a written request from another transit
company and consists of a short summary of working conditions before and after the effective date of Charter Amendment No. 21. In it this statement appears: 'Previous to
Charter amendment, schedules were made out on an eight
hour day with no limits as to range, except that they were
kept as near ten hours as possible. All regular runs under
eight hours were paid full eight hours and time and one-half
was paid for all time beyond eight hours and twenty minutes.
Number of hours after Charter amendment 21? Conditions
same as above, except that overtime is paid after eight hours
instead of after eight hours and twenty minutes, and one
[and one-] half time is also allowed after the tenth hour
range . . . . (Emphasis added.) The statement concerning
eight hours' pay for all regular runs should be read in the
light of the practice then in force of treating a regular run
of seven hours and 45 minutes as the equivalent of a full
eight hour regular run. We conclude that these two items,
viewed in their setting, are in harmony, not in conflict, with
our analysis of the administrative interpretation.
''This is all of the significant evidence of administrative
interpretation which has been brought to our attention by
the parties or discovered by us in the record. It does not
support the finding that the 'administrative construction
adhered to throughout the years of Section 125 of the Charter
is not in contravrntion of petitioner's [respondents', upon
this appeal] construction.'
"(2) In respect to the fixing of 'the wages of platform
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employees and bus operators of the municipal railway,' section
151.3 8 of the charter directs the civil service commission, each
year, to certify to the board of supervisors 'the two highest
wage schedules in effect on July 1st of that year for' such
employees 'of other street railway systems in the State. . . . '
''The board thereupon fixes wage schedules for such employees 'which shall be the average of the two highest wage
schedules so certified' by the commission. If such average is
less than the rate fixed therefor in San Francisco's salary
standardization ordinance adopted March 18, 1946, the board
shall fix the wage schedules at the same rates as those fixed
in that ordinance.
''Respondents claim that section 151.3 requires the commission to include guaranteed hourly, weekly, or monthly
wage rates, if any, in effect in such other railway systems.
The appellants claim that 151.3 does not require the inclusion
of any such guaranty factors.
''The court found that in 1949 the commission certified
that the wage schedules of Torrance Municipal Bus Lines,
Torrance, and the California Street Cable Line, San Francisco, were the two highest. The court further found that
the Torrance schedules provide monthly guaranteed wages
ranging from $231 to $265 according to the number of years
of service of the employee; also, that the California Street
Cable schedule provided for a guaranteed work week of six
days or 48 hours per week ;9 but that the commission refused
to certify those elements of the two highest wage schedules,
certifying only the hourly rate for each. In this connection
we observe that the court also found that the commission
when certifying the Torrance hourly rate, included the several
monthly wage rates ('1st year of service $221 per month equal
to $1.275 per hour . . . 5th year of service $265 per month
equal to $1.52884 per hour' and recited 'Factor used to convert to per hour rate is-4;1 weeks of 40 hours each per
month or 1.73.33 hours per month.'
''The court found that because of the omission of the
'minimum guaranteed work week features' of these two systems from the certification, the commission had deprived
the respondents and others similarly situated of a 'daily and
8

(Stats. 1947, eh. 2 of Res., p. 3264, at p. 3266.)
Appellants do not question the accuracy of this finding as to these
features of the Torrance and California Street schedules, except that they
claim that the California Street 'extra platform men were in direct terms
excluded from the eight hour provision.'
"

9

''
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weekly wage equivalent to the average of the wages receivable
by platform employees and bus operators' of the two systems
mentioned.
"The conclusions of law followed these findings. The judgment gave declaratory relief and ordered the issuance of a
writ of mandate requiring the commission to certify to the
board of supervisors 'in addition to the hourly rate of wages
of the two highest wage schedules in California, any guarantee
of minimum daily, weekly, or monthly wage contained in said
schedules, affecting the wage rate or wages.'
''Although this conclusion may have been based in part
upon the premise that section 125 guarantees wages for at
least eight hours each scheduled workday upon which an
employee performs every assignment given him, the conclusion
does not necessarily fall with that premise. If section 151.3
should, in a given year, guarantee a minimum wage because
the two highest wage schedules of other systems embrace such
a provision that year, it would operate and apply to the
respondents and others similarly situated quite independently
of section 125. Especially so, in view of the positive declaration in section 151.3 that the wages of platform employees
and bus operators shall be determined and fixed as provided
in section 151.3 'Notwithstanding the provisions of section
151 or any other provisions of this charter.'
"Let us analyze the significant portions of section 151.3.
''It was added to the charter as a new section by an amendment which took effect January 15, 1946. ( Oh. 8 of Res.,
1st Ex.Sess. 1946; printed in Stats. 1947, p. 219, at 233. At
that time it provided for the establishment of rates of pay
for 'groups and crafts' predicated upon rates fixed in collective bargaining agreements, under the conditions described
in section 151.3.
''The section was later enlarg·ed by an amendment which
took effect January 7, 1947. (Stats. 1947, ch. 2 of Res., p.
3264, at 3266.) The amendment slightly modified the original
text and added the provisions which now govern the fixing of
wage schedules for platform men and bus operators. In this
form section 151.3 consists of two distinct parts, although
not separately designated as such by paragraph or subdivision
numbers. For convenience of reference we designate them as
Part I (the original text as modified in 1947) and Part II
(the substantive addition made in 1947).
"It is important to consider both parts, for Part I has
been judicially interpreted. That interpretation may be
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helpful in ascertaining the meaning of Part II. The significant portions of the section read as follows:
" 'Section 151.3 [Part I] Notwithstanding any of the provisions of section 151 or any other provisions of this charter,
whenever any groups or crafts establish a rate of pay for such
groups or crafts through collective bargaining agreements
with employers employing such groups or crafts, and such
rate is recognized and paid throughout the industry and the
establishments employing such groups or crafts in San Francisco, and the civil service commission shall certify that such
rate is generally prevailing for such groups or crafts in private
employment in San Francisco pursuant to collective barg·aining agreements, the board of supervisors shall have the
power and it shall be its duty to fix such rate of pay as the
eompensation for such groups and crafts engaged in the city
and county service. rrhe rate of pay so fixed by the board of
supervisors shall be determined on the basis of rates of pay
certified by the civil service commission on or prior to April
1st of each year and shall be effective July 1st following;
provided, that the civil service commission shall review all
such agreements as of July 1st of each year and certify to
the board of supervisors on or before the second Monday of
July any modifications in rates of pay established thereunder
for such crafts or groups as herein provided. The board of
supervisors shall thereupon revise the rates of pay for such
crafts or groups accordingly and the said revised rates of
pay so fixed shall be effective from July 1st of the fiscal year
in which the said revisions are determined . . . .
" '[Part II] Notwithstanding the provisions of section
151 or any other provisions of this charter the wages of platform employees and bus operators of the municipal railway
shall be determined and fixed, annually, as follows:
'' ' (A) On or before the second Monday of July of each
year the civil service commission shall certify to the board
of supervisors the two highest wage schedules in effect on
July 1st of that year for platform employees and bus operators of other street railway systems in the State of California;
" '(B) The board of supervisors shall thereupon fix wage
schedules for platform employees and bus operators of the
municipal railway which shall be the average of the two highest
wage schedules so certified by the civil service commission;
provided, if the average of the two highest wage schedules
shall be less than the rates of pay fixed for such service in
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the salary standardization ordinance adopted by the board of
supervisors on March 18, 1946, the board of supervisors shall
fix wage schedules for such service which shall be the same
as the rates fixed for such service in the said ordinance;
" ' (C) ·when, in addition to their usual duties, such employees are assigned duties of instructors of platform employees or bus operators they shall receive twenty (20¢)
cents per hour above the rates of pay fixed for platform employees and bus operators as herein provided;
'' ' (D) The rates of pay so fixed for platform employees
and bus operators as herein provided shall be effective from
July 1st of the fiscal year in which such rates of pay are
certified by the civil service commission;
" ' (E) Platform employees and bus operators shall be
paid one and one-half times the rate of pay fixed as herein
provided for all work performed on six days specified as
holidays by ordinance of the board of supervisors for such
employees 0
''Part I was interpreted by this court in Adams v. W oljj,
84 Cal.App.2d 435 [190 P.2d 665]. (A petition for a hearing
by the Supreme Court was denied by that court.) The case
involved the rates of pay of municipally employed machinists
and mechanics.
''The pertinent collective bargaining agreements prescribed
pay at a fixed sum for day work on the basis of a work week
consisting of five days, except that when certain holidays fell
on work days the same rate of pay per week was fixed, pay
for a four-day week with such holidays off without loss of
pay. Also, those agreements increased the rate of pay 10
per cent and 15 per cent respectively, for work on night and
midnight shifts. They also provided that a foreman would
receive 10 per cent in excess of the journeyman rate. (The
city conceded the foreman pay differential if Part I were
found constitutional.)
''The judgment of the trial court allowed the holiday pay,
the increased rates for night and midnight shifts, and the
increased rate for foremen. We affirmed the judgment.
"We did so after analyzing the section [Part I] and
finding that by it 'the people have set up a standard for determining rates of pay that will insure these public employees
a wage scale commensurate with wages received by workers in
the same field in private industry.' (Po 443.)
''Concerning holiday pay and premium pay on the night
and midnight shifts, we said: 'Section 15103 requires the
0

•
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"rate of pay" to be fixed in the manner there set forth. It
is contended that this relates only to the "basic" rate of
pay, and that holiday and premium pay on night shifts does
not relate to the "basic" rate of pay but relates to "working
conditions,'' and it is urged that the fixing of working conditions is beyond the scope of section 151.3. It is probably
true that section 151.3 relates only to the "basic" rate of
pay and does not relate to "working conditions." But that
in no way assists defendants. It is quite apparent that it
was the intent of section 151.3 to give to the public employees
of the type here involved the same take home pay received by
private employees in the same industry. 'fhat means that when
the public employees work on a night shift, or where a work
week is interrupted by a holiday they are to receive the same
pay that private employees would receive for work similarly
performed. It is quite obvious that night shift pay and pay
for holidays is a part of the "basic" rate of pay, and is as
much a part of the wage structure as the hourly wage itself.
If evidence were necessary on such an obvious matter it was
supplied by Norman Beals, San Francisco representative for
the State Personnel Board, who so testified. The "basic"
"rate of pay" is. the take home pay of the employee. The
charter provision guarantees that the take home pay of public
employees shall be the same as private employees. That
obviously includes holidays and premium pay for night
work.' (Pp. 444-445.)
"Later, we had for consideration the question whether
or not Part I of section 151.3 envisioned and embraced provisions for vacation with pay (five days each year, after one
year of service ; ten days, after three years of service) if
contained in the pertinent collective bargaining agreements.
We concluded that it did, by the same process of reasoning
as that used in Adams v. Wolff, supra. (Adams v. City &;
Cotmty of Ban Francisco, 94 Cal.App.2d 586 [211 P.2d 368,
212 P.2d 272]. A petition for hearing by the Supreme Court
was denied by that court.) We said: 'the "rate of pay" is
the ''take home pay'' of those on the list of employees in good
standing eligible for active duty . . . . Pay for an unworked
holiday is part of the basic rate of pay. (Adams v. Wolff,
supra.) The number of holidays is de:;;ignated in the private
collective bargaining agreement. With equal right and authority may the same agreement control the number of vacation
days. The period of vacation, if any, set forth in a private
bargaining agreement is the period that the public employees

Feb.1954]

GowANLOCK

v.

TuRNER

329

[42 C.2d 296; 267 P.2d 310]

must accept, for the reason that it is part of the basis upon
which "rate of
'is computed.' (P. 592.)
"'liTe further observed: 'The holding in Adams v. Wolff,
supra, that section 151.3 [Part I] was intended to equalize
take home pay and that holiday pay is a part of the basic
rate of pay must be considered controlling, and forces a
determination that vacation pay directly and with certainty
affects the hourly, the weekly, the monthly or the yearly wage.'
(P. 594.)
''The five and ten day vacation periods which Part I of
section 151.3 thus prescribed, prevailed over the two weeks'
period prescribed by section 151 of the charter because
of the declaration at the very beginning of Part I that its
provisions operate and apply 'notwithstanding the provisions
of section 151.' Later, the addition of sections 151.4 10 and
151.5 11 modified the scope of section 151.3 (both Part I and
Part II) in relation to vacation privileges. That modification
leaves intact the scope and application of Parts I and II of
section 151.3 in relation to other 'take home pay' features
appearing in collective bargaining agreements or in the 'two
highest wage schedules.'
''Section 151.5 in declaring that vacation rights 'contained
. . . in any street railway or bus wages schedules,' as well
as those 'contained in any collective bargaining agreements,'
shall 'in no way increase, reduce, or otherwise affect or be
deemed to affect' the 'wage of pay rate or schedule determinations made pursuant to the provisions of said section 151.3,'
recognizes the possibility that Part II as well as Part I comprehends and embraces guaranteed or minimum wages. We do
not view these provisions as a legislative interpretation or
determination that section 151.5 does comprehend and embrace
such features. It is probable that these references to Part II
of section 151.3 were of a precautionary nature, to preclude
the possibility of such an interpretation in relation to 'vacation rights,' especially in view of the use of the words 'or be
deemed to affeet.' Significantly, however, section 151.5 removes from the purview of section 151.3 [Part II as well as
Part I] only the vacation with pay element of the take home
pay feature, no other element thereof, such as premium pay
for night shifts or guaranteed daily, weekly, or monthly wages.
''

"

102.

10

11

§ 151.4 added: 1949 first Ex. Sess., ch. 4; Stats. 1950, p. 36 at 46.
§ 151.5 added: 1950 third Ex. Sess., ch. 10; Stats. 1951, p. 100, at
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"vVhat of the similarity, if any, of the provisions of Part li
of section 151.3 to Part I of that section, and the applicability
to Part II of our interpretation of Part I?
'' 'J'hey are similar in this: Each reaches out for a yardstick;
Part I to collective bargaining agreements in private industry,
Part II to other street railway systems, public or private. Part
I uses the term 'rates of pay' ; Part II, 'wage schedules.' Part
I uses the rate ('such rate'), established by collective bargaining agreements, which is 'generally prevailing' in San Francisco. Part II uses 'the average of the two highest wage schedules' of other street railway systems than the San Francisco
municipal railway system.
' ' The only seeming differences 12 are : (a) 'The average' in
Part II, instead of 'such rate' in Part I; and (b) 'wage schedules' in Part II, in contrast to 'rates of pay' in Part I. Neither
of these is a differentiating factor. 'The average rate' denotes
a fixed and certain quantity or quality, equally as does 'such
rate.' 'Wages schedules' is equally as comprehensive in its
scope and sweep as is the expression 'rates of pay'; perhaps
more comprehensive, certainly not less comprehensive.
''The conclusion seems irresistible that Part II sets up a
standard for determining wage schedules (rates of pay) that
will assure the municipal platform men and bus operators of
San Francisco a wage scale commensurate with the highest
wages received by workers in the same field in this state (the
same take home pay), using the average of the two highest as
a yardstick.
"vVe conclude that Part II comprehends 'guaranteed or
minimum daily, weekly, or monthly wages' (as found by the
trial court), within the scope of the yardstick prescribed by
Part II of section 151.3 as factors to be ascertained and certified by the civil service commission to the board of supervisors
for the information and use of the board in fixing the indicated
wage schedules.
''Appellants ask how minimum wages can be averaged when
one is a monthly wage and the other is weekly, or when one
street railway system has a minimum wage and the other not.
The answer is that this question is not here involved. It is
the function of the board of supervisors (not the civil service
12
"
We are mindful of the fact that paragraph (E) of Part II iixes
pay at time and one-half for work done on certain holidays and para·
graph (C) prescribes 20 cents per hour extra for instruction service,
features not in Part I. These features, however, are limited in scope and
obviously do not change the overall resemblance of Part II to Part I.
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commission) to do the averaging, when it fixes the wage schedules, and the board is not a party to this action.
"Appellants make the further claim that, prior to suit, the
petitioners made no demand upon the civil service commission
to include the minimum wage factor when certifying the two
highest wage schedules to the court. This, of course, has reference to the writ of mandate, not the declaratory relief count
on that subject.
''The answer is that the record demonstrates that such a
demand would have been futile. (Moreing v. Shields, 28 Cal.
App. 513 [152 P. 964] ; Moore v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.
299 [128 P. 946] .)
''Appellants further contend the judgment is erroneous in
directing a peremptory writ of mandate on this subject because
the alternative writ of mandate did not include such a provision. The answer to this point is that the respondents in their
amended petition asked for a writ of mandate for certification
of the minimum wage features of the Torrance and California
Street Lines, and for general relief; the appellants joined
issue; the case was thoroughly tried; and the appellants have
not indicated that they presented this point to the trial court. 13
The trial court, of course, did not in its judgment command
the commission to certify the minimum wage features of the
Torrance and California Street Cable Lines. Certification
occurs each year. No one could predict what two street railway
systems might in future years have the highest wage schedules.
The court did appropriately direct the commission to include
minimum wage features appearing in any wage schedule certified by it to the board of supervisors in any year in the
future. In this situation, the principles enunciated in Buxbom
v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, at 542-543 [145 P.2d 305], apply.
"(3) We do not find the judgment uncertain or contradictory in its provisions. Should ambiguities develop, we
believe they could be resolved by reference to the :findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
" ( 4) The practice and procedural points presented by the
appellants include the following claims asserted by them:
(a) the respondents are not in a position, have not the legal
right to raise the questions presented by them, (b) there is
no true basis for a class suit, and (c) the judgment is incapable
13
"
The alternative writ was issued in July, 1949. The second amended
petition was filed in March, 1951. The return to the second amended
petition was filed May 8, 1951. The case was tried on the issues thus
joined, the trial commencing June 7, 1951.
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of complete enforcement for lack of proper parties and for
failure to include the controller and the civil service commission in the writ of mandate to Turner.
"(a) The claim that the respondents are without legal right
to raise the questions p1·esented by them seems predicated
upon the asserted fact that the seniority of each of the respondent(s) is such that he, in
has an eight-hour day.
This we think is not a significant factor. It appears to be
true that a high seniority may presently assure a platform man
or bus operator of a run of such a
that he will be able
perhaps eight hours within
to put in eight hours each
a span of ten; and thus also be assured of his minimum wage.
However, it is possible, under appellants' interpretation of
the charter that management in response to rider demand
might find it necessary to readjust the service in such a manner
as to reduce a good many regular runs to considerably less
than eight hours, and divide others into parts, spreading them
over a span considerably in excess of ten hours. In other words,
it appears that each senior employee has this sword of Damocles
suspended over him by a potentially slender thread. He believes that the charter makes certain guaranties. He should
be able to have such questions determined before the sword
falls. (The second amended petition in this action was filed
March 14, 1951, and the judgment is not yet final.) 'l'he law
accords him that right. He, therefore, is properly in court,
asserting his claim.
"(b) Appellants contend the'I'C 1:s no true basis for a class
suit. They question the propriety of extending the benefits
of this judgment to include other 'employees similarly situated.'
''They present two bases for this claim. The first is that
there are two unions to which the employees in the operating
department of the municipal system respectively belong, no
employee having membership in both unions. It is asserted
that the respondents belong to but one of these unions and
therefore cannot very well represent those employees who
give adherence to the other union. This, we think, is a false
quantity. 'l'he respondents appear in this action as employees
of the city and county, not as members of a union. Neither
of the unions, as such, is a party to the action.
"The other premise iil that each of the respond en til 'is
that each of the respondents afforded the identical work
schedule sought for in this seeond amended petition, if they
had not of their own volition, absented themselves from work.'
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f>""'""'"'"""' Opening Brief, pp. 61, 62.) From this premise
solely for the purpose of discussion the accuracy
of this quoted statement), appellants conclude that the respondents do not belong to the same class or group as those
operators, whether regular or extra men, who do not presently
enjoy such a schedule. 'l'hat conclusion does not follow. For,
as we have seen (in subparagraph (a), above), respondents'
enjoyment of the sought for schedule (under appellants' interpretation of the charter) is not a matter of right; i.e., a
mere privilege, enjoyed today and gone tomorrow. This certainly puts these respondents in the same class as all other
operators, whether regular or extra men .
. "(c) Appellants daim that the jtLdgment is incapable of
complete enforcement because of the absence as parties of
the public utilities commission and the city and county itself,
and the mandate to Turner does not run also to the controller
and the civil service commission.
''In this connection they direct attention to the fact that
Manager Turner, who by this judgment is directed to certify
time rolls or payrolls in a certain manner, works under the
direction of the public utilities commission and the commission, not a party to the action, would not be bound by the
judgment. They direct attention also to the fact that although
the members and secretary of the civil service commission are
parties, the judgment does not operate directly upon them by
way of ordering them, when scrutinizing payrolls, to recognize
the certification of eight hours per day per man by Turner.
They make the same observation in respect to Controller Ross
who, though a party to the action, is not by the judgment
expressly directed to do anything.
'' vV e may assume for the purpose of this discussion that
the controller and the civil service commission and its secretary, although parties to the action, might not be bound by
Manager Turner's certification of payrolls. That would not
necessarily render the judgment incomplete or abortive.
Should the judgment in the form rendered become final, it
would be binding upon Manager Turner and would govern
him in the certification of payrolls. The mere fact that it might
not be binding upon and govern these other officials, including the members of the public utilities commission, would
furnish no sufiicient reason in itself for reversal of the judgment. There is no basis for assuming that these other officials would disregard the law as thus adjudicated. Should
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they disregard it as thus finally adjudicated, the remedy
would be the institution of another legal proceeding of an
appropriate nature.
''The judgment is reversed insofar as it declares that
respondents (the petitioners below, and employees similarly
situated) are entitled to wages for at least eight hours each
scheduled workday (as stated in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 3 of the judgment) and insofar as it orders and decrees
that a writ of mandate issue ordering appellant James Turner
to approve and transmit to the civil service commission time
rolls or payrolls showing that each respondent and employee
similarly situated is credited for at least eight hours of
work within a span of ten, each scheduled workday (as
stated in paragraph 1 of the judgment). In all other respects
the judgment is affirmed. Each party will bear his own costs
upon this appeal.''
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-! agree with the discussion
in the majority opinion concerning section 125 of the charter.
It is my opinion, however, that for the reasons set forth in
the opinion written by Mr. Justice Fred B. Wood for the
District Court of Appeal, 1st Dist., Div. 1, when this case
was before that court (Oal.App.) 256 P.2d 662, section 151.3
of the charter requires consideration of any minimum wage
guarantees included in the wage schedules of the other street
railway systems.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.

